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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Alexander Jason Woodley appeals from the denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
This appeal is from proceedings for post-conviction relief under the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"). The facts and procedural 
history of the underlying criminal case are set forth by the Idaho Court of Appeals 
as follows: 
Woodley was charged with felony operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol, having had two convictions in 
the previous ten years, Idaho Code Sections 18-8004 and 18-
8005(5). On April 9, 2007, the parties filed a plea agreement that 
was signed by Woodley, his attorney, and the prosecutor. In it, 
Woodley agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the State's 
recommendation that he be granted a withheld judgment and 
placed on probation. The plea agreement specified that Woodley 
would be entitled to withdraw his plea if the court did not adopt the 
recommended sentence. The court accepted the plea and set the 
matter for sentencing. On May 21, 2007, the court imposed a 
unified seven-year sentence, with four years fixed, instead of 
withholding judgment. The court suspended the sentence, 
however, and placed Woodley on probation for five years. Woodley 
did not then move to withdraw his plea; he accepted probation on 
the specified terms. On July 2, 2007, Woodley filed a notice of 
appeal, which was subsequently dismissed for failure to pay the 
necessary fees. The remittitur from that appeal was issued on 
November 14, 2007. 
On February 1, 2008, after a series of probation violations, 
the district court revoked Woodley's probation but retained 
jurisdiction for 180 days pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-
2601 (4 ). Woodley filed a pro se appeal on March 5, 2008, 
challenging the revocation of his probation. This Court affirmed the 
revocation of probation in an unpublished decision issued June 26, 
2009. On April 11, 2008, while that appeal was pending, Woodley 
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filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On September 4, 2008, 
the district court issued an order denying Woodley's request for 
withdrawal of the plea on the ground that the court lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain the motion. 
State v. Woodley, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 599, Docket No. 38348, at pp. 
1-2 (Idaho App., August 30, 2011). 1 
Woodley filed a post-conviction petition initiating this case on March 25, 
2009. (R., p. 7.) He asserted claims that his plea was the result of duress; that 
his counsel was ineffective for failing to "properly address Notice of Appeal and 
Plea Agreement violations"; and that his conviction violated due process. (R., p. 
8.) He also moved for the appointment of counsel and a motion for equitable 
tolling of the statute of limitation. (R., pp. 22-24, 34-37.) The court granted the 
motion for counsel. (R., pp. 52, 56.) The court also ordered that the motion to 
toll the statute of limitation would be addressed before the state was required to 
answer the petition. (R., pp. 53-54.) 
Counsel for Woodley filed a brief (prepared by Woodley) and an affidavit 
(also prepared by Woodley) with exhibits in support of the motion to toll the 
statute of limitation. (R., pp. 58-84.2) After a hearing the district court denied the 
motion to toll the statute of limitation. (Tr., pp. 1-11; R., pp. 105-12.) The court 
ruled that it would "not consider any issues pertaining to this Court's original 
Judgment of May 21, 2007." (R., p. 112.) 
1 On or about September 19, 2011, Woodley filed a motion to take judicial notice 
of the appellate "file, clerk's record and transcripts" from docket number 38348. 
2 Additional copies of the exhibits are in the record at pages 38-48 and 85-102. 
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After the district court denied his motion to toll the statute of limitation, 
Woodley, through counsel, filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief 
alleging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel related to probation violation 
proceedings. (R., pp. 146-47.) The state filed a motion for summary dismissal of 
the amended petition, asserting it was untimely and failed to present a material 
issue of fact. (R., pp. 163-64.) Thereafter the parties stipulated to allow Woodley 
to file an amended petition, which the district court granted. (R., pp. 167, 171.) 
The second amended petition re-alleged the claim that counsel had been 
ineffective for failing to move to withdraw Woodley's plea when the district court 
imposed a sentence contrary to the binding plea agreement and in failing to 
perfect his original appeal. (R., pp. 173-75.) The petition also alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel from Woodley's "first petition for post conviction relief' for 
failing to raise the issue of the plea agreement not being followed at sentencing. 
(R., pp. 175-76.) The second amended petition abandoned the claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel during probation revocation proceedings. (R., 
pp. 173-76.) 
After a status conference the parties stipulated to again amend the 
petition. (R., p. 178.) The third amended petition added a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to appeal from the denial of the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea. (R., pp. 184-87.) 
The state filed another motion for summary disposition, asserting the third 
amended petition was untimely and that it failed to present any material issue of 
fact. (R., pp. 193-94.) After a hearing on the motion (R., p. 195) the court 
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granted the motion in part, dismissing all claims except the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to file a notice of appeal from the denial of the 
motion to withdraw the guilty plea (R., pp. 199-209). That claim proceeded to an 
evidentiary hearing, after which the district court granted relief by reinstating 
Woodley's right to appeal from the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. (R., pp. 239-49, 251-53.) Woodley thereafter filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R., pp. 254-56.) 
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ISSUE 
Woodley states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in declining to equitably toll the 
statute of limitations on Mr. Woodley's claims that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to the district court's error in 
sentencing and allowing the first appeal to be dismissed? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Woodley failed to show that he presented admissible evidence 
sufficient to create a material issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitation 
should have been tolled? 
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ARGUMENT 
Woodley Has Failed To Show That He Presented Admissible Evidence To 
Establish A Material Issue Of Fact Related To Tolling The Statute Of Limitation 
A. Introduction 
A petition for post-conviction relief must be filed "within one (1) year ... 
from the determination of an appeal." I.C. § 19-4902(a). The remittitur from the 
appeal in the underlying criminal case was issued on November 14, 2007, and 
the petition was filed in this case on March 25, 2009, more than four months after 
the limitation period expired. Woodley does not contend that the petition was 
timely filed, but only that the limitation period should have been equitably tolled 
due to his mental illness. (See generally Appellant's brief.) The district court 
twice found that Woodley's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not 
objecting when the district court imposed but suspended a sentence instead of 
withholding judgment as required by the binding plea agreement was time-
barred. (R., pp. 105-12, 199-209.) Review of the record shows that the district 
court did not err because Woodley presented no evidence creating any material 
issue of fact regarding whether the UPCPA statute of limitation should be tolled. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appellate review of summary dismissal, the appellate court determines 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists upon the record. Rhoades v. 
State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009); Baxter v. State, 149 
Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 2010). The application of a statute 
of limitation to an action under a given set of facts is a question of law subject to 
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free review on appeal. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069; State v. 
O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 245, 796 P.2d 121, 122 (1990); Cochran v. State, 133 
Idaho 205, 206, 984 P.2d 128, 129 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court can 
affirm the dismissal of an untimely petition on the correct legal theory even if the 
dismissal was on a different theory. Leerv. State, 148 Idaho 112,218 P.3d 1173 
(Ct. App. 2009) (affirming dismissal of untimely petition even though district court 
had found the limitation period tolled and dismissed on other grounds). 
C. Review Of The Record Shows No Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That 
Would Equitably Toll The Statute Of Limitation 
Generally, "equitable tolling" is available only where the petitioner shows 
that "extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time." 
Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2nd Cir. 2000) (discussing equitable 
tolling theories in the context of federal habeas petitions); see Chico-Rodriguez v. 
State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005) (discussing 
"extraordinary circumstances" and acknowledging "the bar for equitable tolling for 
post-conviction actions is high"). Idaho appellate courts have recognized that the 
one-year limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902 may be tolled if an applicant is 
prevented, either by mental disease or by being denied access to courts, from 
earlier pursuing challenges to his or her conviction. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 
957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003); Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 
791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct. App. 1999). "A petitioner's due process right is not 
violated by a statute of limitation bar unless he can show such an inability to file a 
timely petition that he was denied any meaningful opportunity to present his post-
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conviction claims." Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, _, 256 P.3d 791, 794 (Ct. 
App. 2011 ). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained what a petitioner must show to 
prevail on a claim that he was denied a meaningful opportunity to present claims 
due to mental illness, such that the limitation period tolls: 
We hold that in order for the statute of limitation under the UPCPA 
to be tolled on account of a mental illness, an unrepresented 
petitioner must show that he suffered from a serious mental illness 
which rendered him incompetent to understand his legal right to 
bring an action within a year or otherwise rendered him incapable 
of taking necessary steps to pursue that right. Equitable tolling will 
apply only during the period in which the petitioner's mental illness 
actually prevented him from filing a post-conviction action; any 
period following conviction during which the petitioner fails to meet 
the equitable tolling criteria will count toward the limitation period. 
Chico-Rodriguez, 141 Idaho at 582, 114 P.3d at 140. Thus, summary dismissal 
of the petition for untimely filing was proper if Woodley failed to present evidence 
making a prima facie showing that he suffered from a mental illness which 
rendered him incompetent or otherwise incapable of acting on his post-conviction 
rights. See DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,603,200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009) 
(petition subject to summary dismissal if applicant has not presented evidence of 
prima facie case establishing claim); Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 862, 243 
P.3d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Woodley presented no evidence that he suffered from any mental illness 
"which rendered him incompetent to understand his legal right to bring an action 
within a year or otherwise rendered him incapable of taking necessary steps to 
pursue that right." Chico-Rodriguez, 141 Idaho at 582, 114 P.3d at 140. 
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Although Woodley apparently suffers from depression, there is no evidence that 
this was in any way debilitating, much less that it prevented a timely filing. 
On appeal Woodley points out that he was hospitalized on November 9, 
2007. (Appellant's brief, p. 7.) The record that he cites, State's Exhibit A in 
docket no. 38348, shows that he was hospitalized because he intentionally cut 
his own foot while in jail on a probation violation and was "transferred [to the 
behavioral Health Center] for evaluation of potential suicidality." (#38348 State's 
Exhibit A, History and Physical, p. 1.) In screening the hospital noted "no 
evidence of thought disorder or organic dysfunction." (Id.) Although Woodley 
had a history self-destructive behavior, including suicide attempts, the diagnosing 
psychiatrist stated "[t]here is no evidence of bizarre thinking, paranoia, or 
hallucinatory activities." (#38348 State's Exhibit A, Psychiatric Evaluation, pp. 1-
2.) The underlying cause of Woodley's self-destructive behaviors was suspected 
to be "an underlying depression." (Id. at p. 3.) Thus, although the record does 
establish that Woodley suffered from depression, it also establishes that he was 
not incompetent or incapable of knowing and pursuing his rights. 
Woodley also contends he was prescribed "psychotropic medicine," citing 
his own statements in his motion to stay. (Appellant's brief, p. 7 (citing R, p. 
36).) The documents submitted in support of that claim, however, show that he 
was not prescribed psychotropic medication, but an antidepressant. (R., pp. 77-
83.) That drug included the benefits of "improving mood, energy [and] 
concentration" although possible side effects included anxiety, headaches, 
fatigue and sedation. (R, pp. 77-79, 83.) No evidence suggests that the 
9 
prescribed antidepressant would have in any way incapacitated him or otherwise 
interfered with his ability to timely file for post-conviction relief. 
Woodley also relies on the fact that, after the district court retained 
jurisdiction program after Woodley violated his probation, Woodley was 
temporarily removed from the retained jurisdiction program to the medium 
security prison to stabilize his mental health. (R., p. 71.) That stabilization 
apparently coincides with his medication with antidepressants. (Compare R., p. 
71 (5/11/08 APSI mentioning removal) with R., p. 83 (5/5/08 consent for 
medication).) Woodley was returned to complete the program, however, but did 
not do well in it. (R., pp. 73-74.) 
Finally, although it might be possible to infer that Woodley was incapable 
of acting on his post-conviction rights at or near the times of his hospitalizations, 
such does not show that he was incapacitated for the entire 16 months between 
the remittitur and the filing of the petition. As recently noted in Schultz, a window 
of six weeks during the limitation period in which the petition could have been 
filed has been deemed sufficient to defeat a tolling claim. Schultz, 151 Idaho at 
_, 256 P.3d at 794-95 (citing Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190-91, 30 
P.3d 967, 968-69 (2001)). Woodley's evidence does not even show six weeks of 
incapacity. 
The evidence presented regarding Woodley's mental health shows that he 
suffers from depression, and apparently has for a period of years. That 
depression has led to suicide attempts while incarcerated (but apparently not 
while outside of the jail or prison) and intervention through medication to stabilize 
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his mood. There is no evidence in the record, however, that either the 
depression or the medication to treat it incapacitated Woodley in any way, much 
less to the extent necessary to toll the statute of limitation. Because the 
evidence presented does not constitute a prima facie case for equitable tolling, 
the petition was properly dismissed as untimely. 
D. Woodley's Other Claims Of Tolling, Asserted For The First Time On 
Appeal, Are Unpreserved For Appellate Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). See also 
Hoover v. Hunter, 150 Idaho 658, _, 249 P.3d 851, 856-57 (2011) ("Because 
no objection was raised to the decision of the district court, that issue has not 
been preserved for appeal."); State v. Hanson, 150 Idaho 729, _, 249 P.3d 
1184, 1186 (Ct. App. 2011) ("This Court will not address an issue not preserved 
for appeal by an objection in the trial court."). Whether an issue was preserved 
presents a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 
832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989). Because actions under the UPCPA are civil actions, 
the exception to the preservation rule for fundamental error applicable in criminal 
cases is inapplicable. Person v. State, 147 Idaho 453, 455, 210 P.3d 561, 563 
(Ct. App. 2009). 
Woodley argues for the first time on appeal that the statute of limitation 
should have been tolled by the filing of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the 
underlying criminal case, by ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to that 
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motion, and because of the prosecutor's arguments in response to that motion. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 8-13.) Because these claims were never presented to the 
district court as grounds for tolling the statute of limitation in this case, they are 
not properly considered for the first time on appeal. 
Even if these issues could be considered on the merits, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals has already rejected Woodley's claim that the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea should be considered a post-conviction pleading. State v. Woodley, 
2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 599, Docket No. 38348, at p. 3 (Idaho App., 
August 30, 2011) (rejecting claim that district court had jurisdiction to consider 
motion to withdraw guilty plea as post-conviction petition). The filing of the 
motion in the underlying criminal case did not represent a filing for post-
conviction relief and there is no basis to relate the filing of the current petition 
back to the filing of that motion. 
Woodley has failed to show that the district court erred by rejecting his 
argument that the statute of limitation should be tolled due to mental illness. His 




The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court 
summary dismissal of claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel at the 
time of sentencing. 
DATED this 17th day of October, 2011. 
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